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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
In this age of growing technology, the value of proprietary rights
has rapidly increased. Businesses have responded by fiercely protecting
intellectual property rights. Legal counsel advising their corporate clients
must consider the rights, remedies, and appropriate application of intel-
lectual property laws. Further, counsel must consider the substantive
requirements to obtain trade secret, trademark, copyright, and patent
protection and vigilantly prevent or resolve infringement upon the pro-
tections thereby acquired.
Trademarks provide a shortcut for consumers to associate goods
with a specific producer, the trademark owner. The Lanham Trademark
Act ("Lanham Act")' established substantive federal legislation for the
protection of trademarks.2 Through the Lanham Act, Congress protects
against the deceptive or misleading use of trademarks in commerce to
prevent consumer confusion and to protect a trademark owner's invest-
ment in the mark.3 With this statutory protection in place, counsel should
attend to the extent of protection available for business marks, including
the gamut of remedies available for trademark infringement and the
limitations thereupon.
During the survey period,4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit addressed the recovery of compensatory damages for
trademark infringement Part I of this survey addresses the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Lanham Act in the areas of awarding trade-
mark protection and identifying trademark infringement. Part II proceeds
to evaluate recoverable damages of trademark infringement, highlighting
the special limitations on an award of attorney's fees and an accounting
of defendant's profits acquired through the unlawful use of the plaintiff's
trademark. Finally, Part III details the split in the federal circuits regard-
ing recovery for an accounting of profits and specifically addresses the
Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "bad faith" or "willfulness" requirement
for recovery of an accounting of profits.
Patents provide protection for artists and inventors of extraordinary
writings, inventions, and discoveries. The Patent and Copyright Clause
1. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Trademark Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
2. See George Russell Thill, Note, The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act: Damage Awards
for False Advertising and Consumer Standing under Section 43(A)-Congress Drops the Ball Twice,
6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 361, 361 (1994).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1127; see also S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (expressing the basic
purposes of trademark legislation).
4. The survey period is from August 31, 1998 through September 1, 1999.
5. See Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998).
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of the Constitution provides a limited period of exclusive control over an
invention to encourage intellectual creativity and invention.6 While re-
viewing regulation of unpatented subject matter, the Supreme Court es-
tablished the broad preemption over state law of this constitutionally
authorized federal patent law.7 However, the Supreme Court has since
carved out several state law exceptions to the doctrine of federal pre-
emption.' These exceptions are crucial to effect the licensing of patent
rights. Therefore, counsel should consider the interplay between state
contract law and federal patent law when drafting licensing agreements
regarding patent rights.
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit also addressed the issue
of federal patent law preemption of state contract law in the context of
state licensing agreements. Part I of this survey addresses the congres-
sional policies behind patent protection, the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of these policies, and the federal preemption doctrine in the area of
patent law. Part II proceeds to evaluate the Supreme Court's exceptions
to the federal preemption doctrine and specifically addresses exceptions
regarding state contract law. Next, Part III addresses the Tenth Circuit's
approach to the interaction of state licensing agreements and the federal
patent scheme. Finally, Part IV analyzes the impact of inapplicability of
federal patent law.
I. RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Trademark regulation is of crucial concern because a word, slogan,
picture, or symbol has become a merchandising short cut inducing a con-
sumer to associate a mark with certain goods and services.' In 1946,
Congress enacted the Lanham Act to provide a federal statutory scheme
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
8. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (permitting state
regulation of unpatented subject matter affecting trade secrets); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (permitting state regulation of unpatented subject matter affecting state
contract laws).
9. See Naimie v. Cytozyme Lab., Inc., 174 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 1999).
10. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
The Supreme Court has recognized that a familiar trademark can be invaluable to a producer because
of the psychological function of the symbol. See id. The mark can induce a consumer to purchase:
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of
the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means
employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained,
the trade-mark owner has something of value.
(Vol. 77:3
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
for trademark regulation." Congress intended to provide consistent na-
tional regulation by
regulatfing] commerce within the control of Congress by making ac-
tionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such com-
merce; ... protect[ing] registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation; .. .protect[ing] per-
sons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; ... [and]
prevent[ing] fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of re-
productions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered
marks ......
To protect a trademark owner's investment of time, energy, and
money, and to stop the deceptive and misleading use of marks, the Lan-
ham Act outlines the elements of trademark infringement and establishes
remedies for infringement." The federal circuits differ in their interpreta-
tion of the available compensatory damages for infringement. Possible
compensatory damages include awarding an accounting of defendant's
profits, damages sustained by the plaintiff, and costs of the action.'4 Spe-
cifically, the federal circuits have split concerning the availability of an
accounting of profits for trademark infringement. 5 In Bishop v. Equinox
Int'l Corp, 6 the Tenth Circuit considered whether compensatory dam-ages should be awarded in trademark infringement cases.
A. Background
1. Trademark Classification
Congress passed the Lanham Act to protect persons engaged in
commerce against unfair competition by prohibiting the "deceptive or
misleading use of marks."' 7 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... [used] to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown."'" To register the mark, the
11. See Robyn L. Phillips, Determining if a Trade Dress is Valid, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 457, 464
(1992-1993).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
13. See id. § 1114 (describing infringement and providing for civil action for the infringement
of registered marks); id. § 1125 (describing infringement and providing for civil action for the
infringement of unregistered marks); S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (emphasizing the importance
of protecting the trademark owner from "misappropriation by pirates and cheats").
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
15. See discussion infra Part 1.5.
16. 154 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998). See discussion infra Part 1.5.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. "The term 'mark' includes any trademark, service mark, collective
mark, or certification mark. The term 'use in commerce' means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark." Id.
18. Id. Trademark laws also include "trade name" and "commercial name" protection as
defined by the Lanham Act. Id.
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Lanham Act requires that a mark be capable of distinguishing the appli-
cant's goods from those of others.'9
Generally, trademarks receive protection if the mark is distinctive
and identifies the source of a product. 20 The Supreme Court separates
trademarks into classes of increasing distinctiveness, which afford the
marks increasing levels of protection. 2' The Court classifies trademarks
as (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanci-
ful. 22 A generic mark indicates the "'basic nature of articles or services'
rather than the more individualized characteristics of a particular prod-
UCt. ' 23 A descriptive mark "'identifies a characteristic or quality of an
article or service,' such as its color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingre-
dients. 24 A suggestive mark "suggests, rather than describes, some par-
ticular characteristic of the goods or services to which it applies and re-
quires the consumer to exercise the imagination in order to draw a con-
clusion as to the nature of the goods and services. 25 Arbitrary or fanciful
marks "bear no relationship to the products or services to which they ...
appl[y] .26
Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are entitled to protection
because they are inherently distinctive and the nature of the mark identi-
fies the source of the product.27 Generic marks do not receive protection
because they are too general. 28 The Supreme Court has said that "generic
marks-those that 'refe[r] to the genus of which the particular product is
a species,' are not registerable as trademarks., 29 Descriptive marks-
which merely describe a product-are generally not protected because
they are not inherently distinctive and do not identify the source of the
product.30 However, if a descriptive mark "becomes] distinctive of the
applicant's goods in commerce," the mark acquires "secondary
19. Id. § 1052.
20. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992) (articulating the
various classes of trademarks and their respective levels of protection).
21. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
22. See id.
23. Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir. 1974)). "A
generic term is 'the name of a particular genus or class of which an individual article or service is
but a member." Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790 (quoting Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115
(5th Cir. 1979)). For example, the term "aspirin" or "cellophane" is generic. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Vision Ctr., 596 F.2d at 115). For example, the term "Alo" referring "to
products containing gel of the aloe vera plant" is descriptive. Id.
25. Id. at 791. For example, "[tihe term 'Coppertone' [is] suggestive in regard to sun tanning
products." Id. (citing Douglas Labs. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir. 1954)).
26. Id. For example, the term "Kodak" is fanciful for photographic supplies. Id. (citing
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 137 Misc. 506, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (1930)).
27. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
28. See id. at 768.
29. Id. (quoting Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
30. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
[Vol. 77:3
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cant's goods in commerce," the mark acquires "secondary meaning"3'
and is therefore entitled to protection under the Lanham Act.32 Summa-
rizing this analysis, the Supreme Court has developed the general rule
that "[an identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being protected
if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning."3
After counsel obtains protection for a client's business marks, coun-
sel must attend to potential infringement of these marks. The Lanham
Act, as followed by the Supreme Court and federal circuits, outlines the
appropriate test to determine trademark infringement.
2. Trademark Infringement
The Lanham Act uses the "likelihood of confusion" test to determine
trademark infringement.34 The Act states:
[a]ny person who.., uses in commerce any word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device ... which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."
When a trademark is of such a nature to warrant protection, a plain-
tiff has the burden of proving that the mark causes the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion in the market.36 The fundamental inquiry for trademark
infringement cases is whether the consumer is "likely to be deceived or
confused by the similarity of the marks."37
The Tenth Circuit evaluates trademark infringement cases by ap-
plying the "likelihood of confusion" test. 8 The Tenth Circuit has held
31. Park 'n Fly, 469 U.S. at 194. "The concept of secondary meaning recognizes that words
with an ordinary and primary meaning of their own 'may by long use [in connection] with a
particular product, come to be known by the public as specifically designating that product."'
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974)).
32. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), (f)).
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
35. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
36. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. See also Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d
1360, 1361 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish defendant's product was likely to
create consumer confusion); Lang v. Retirement Living Publ'g Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that defendant did not infringe on plaintiffs trade name because plaintiff failed to
prove consumer confusion).
37. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 780 (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194,
1201 (9th Cir. 1979)).
38. See Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1998). See also
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
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that "[c]onfusion occurs when consumers make an incorrect mental asso-
ciation between the involved commercial products or their producers."39
To determine whether confusion exists, the Tenth Circuit has used the
following six factors:
(a) the degree of similarity between the marks, including the marks'
appearance, pronunciation, suggestion, and manner of display;
(b) strength or weakness of the plaintiff's mark;
(c) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark;
(d) similarities and differences of the parties' goods, services and
marketing strategies;
(e) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers of the
goods or services involved; and
40(f) evidence of actual confusion, if any.
Because the relevance of the factors varies with each case, all of the
factors contribute to a final determination.4 ' However, the Tenth Circuit
has noted that the key factor is the likelihood of confusion based on the
marks' similarity.42
that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact that appellate courts will review under a clear error
analysis); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 923 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting
that although the federal circuits split regarding the standard of review for likelihood of confusion,
the Tenth Circuit follows a clear error review).
39. Jordache Enters. Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 564 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
40. Heartsprings, 143 F.3d at 554. See also King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the same six factors to determine
trademark infringement); Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 729
(1938)); Prime Media, Inc. v. Primedia, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 932, 937 (D. Kan. 1998) (adopting the
same six factors to determine trademark infringement). But see Libman Co., 69 F.3d at 1364
(Coffey, J., dissenting). In Libman, the Seventh Circuit failed to follow similar factors. Id. at 1364-
65. Judge Coffey, dissenting, criticized the majority's analysis for "depart[ing] from well-established
precedent in [the Seventh] [C]ircuit," which, until Libman, had included analysis of the following
factors:
1. similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion;
2. similarity of the products;
3. area and manner of concurrent use;
4. degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers;
5. strength of complainant's mark;
6. actual confusion; and
7. intent of defendant to 'palm-off his product as that of another.'
Id.
41. • See Heartsprings, 143 F.3d at 554. With a "clear error" standard of review, the appellate
court is faced with a high threshold for reversal. Id. at 553-54. Therefore, although a trial court
incorrectly analyzes one or more factors, a genuine dispute of material fact will probably not exist
with all factors considered together and properly analyzed. Id. at 558.
42. See id. at 554.
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After counsel successfully proves trademark infringement of a cli-
ent's mark, the client is entitled to a variety of remedies. For monetary
recovery, including plaintiffs losses, defendant's profits, and costs of the
action, counsel must plead the requisite provisions outlined by the Lan-
ham Act and interpreted by the federal circuits in order to recover.
3. Recoverable Damages43
The Lanham Act mandates that if a plaintiff establishes trademark
infringement "in any civil action arising under this [Act], the plaintiff
shall be entitled, subject to . . . the principles of equity, to recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages [the plaintiff] sustain[s], . . . and (3)
the costs of the action."' Generally, plaintiffs damages can include ac-
tual damages, defendant's profits, equitable adjustments, counterfeit
remedies, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest in exceptional cases
as appropriate to each case.
To recover for actual damages, defined as "any damages sustained
by the plaintiff," a plaintiff must prove that the trademark infringement
caused actual consumer confusion and that the plaintiff suffered an actual
injury .47 The plaintiffs actual losses often include various injuries to the
business of the trademark owner.4 '8 Accordingly, plaintiffs most com-
monly recover for their sales lost or diverted due to the trademark in-
fringement. 9 If the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove actual lost
or diverted sales, some federal circuits have awarded actual damages
based "on the reasonable royalty rate normally charged for the infringing
use. ' In addition to lost sales, plaintiffs can recover money spent as a
43. Remedies for trademark infringement include preliminary and permanent injunctions as
well as monetary damages. Monetary damages are often subordinate to an injunction because a
plaintiff needs to establish only the likelihood of confusion to get an injunction. An award of
monetary damages requires a greater burden of proof. See Ralph S. Brown, Civil Remedies for
Intellectual Property Invasions:Themes and Variations, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 45, 51, 65
(1992). The Tenth Circuit awards monetary damages, including accounting of profits, based on a
split approach of the federal circuits. Therefore, this paper will focus solely on monetary damages.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
45. See Christopher P. Bussert, Monetary Recovery in Intellectual Property Cases, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1998, at 357, 361-89 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 537, 1991).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
47. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 362. See also Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d
513, 525 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff may recover for actual consumer confusion caused
by the trademark infringement).
48. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 362.
49. See id. at 363. See also St. Charles Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 737 F.2d 891, 893 (11 th Cir.
1983) ("[P]rofits from lost sales ... are sales made by defendants to purchasers who sought to buy
plaintiffs' products and instead received defendants'."); Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 525-26 (examining
the evidentiary characteristics and methods involved in proving lost or diverted sales).
50. Bussert, supra note 45, at 367.
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result of the defendant's infringement.5' For example, in false advertising52 5
cases, plaintiffs may recover for corrective advertising expenses.53 In
franchise cases, plaintiffs can recover interest on lost franchise fees and
money required to entice new licensees. 4
To recover "defendant's profits," the plaintiff must typically prove
that the defendant willfully infringed5 on plaintiff's trademark 6 To cal-
culate defendant's profits, plaintiffs have the simplified burden of estab-
lishing only defendant's gross sales. 7 Courts may give the plaintiff "[tihe
benefit of the doubt. . . where records are inadequate or unavailable to
prove defendant's profits."58 After the plaintiff has proved defendant's
gross profits, the burden shifts to the defendant. 9 The defendant has the
burden of proving expenses, which the court will subtract from defen-
dant's gross revenues in order to calculate the defendant's profit from the
infringement. 6° However, courts do not allow deductions for losses on
infringing sales, federal income taxes on infringement sales, or attorney's
fees for litigation resulting from infringement.
6'
Courts have discretion to make equitable adjustments to plaintiffs
monetary award by either adding or subtracting an amount to or from
damages based on the circumstances of the case.62 The Lanham Act al-
lows the court to adjust the award of profits if the court deems that the
award is excessive or inadequate.6 ' For example, for defendant's willful
51. Bussert, supra note 45, at 368.
52. False advertising cases arise from false representations or descriptions "made in the
advertising context, especially in regard to assurances made about the quality of goods or services."
See Thill, supra note 2, at 363-64.
53. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 368-69. See also Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1374-76 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that when the plaintiff has yet to
expend resources on corrective advertising, courts may calculate the amount recoverable by
analyzing the amount spent by the defendant on infringing advertisements).
54. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370.
55. See discussion of willful infringement infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
56. However, a split has developed among the circuits and some circuits have abandoned the
defendant's bad faith requirement. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370.
57. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 373.
58. Id. See also Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484,
1488 (1 1th Cir. 1987) ("Although the exact amount of infringing sales cannot be determined from
the [evidence], exactness is not required. [The defendant] is in the best position to ascertain exact
sales and profits, and it bears the burden of doing so in an accounting.").
59. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 374. See also Wesco, 833 F.2d at 1488.
60. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 374-75. See also Wesco, 833 F.2d at 1488. The deduction
of costs must be a specific cost or expense related to the sale of infringing goods or services. See
Bussert, supra note 45, at 375. If defendant fails to prove deductible costs, courts have awarded
defendant's entire gross income to plaintiff. See Id.
61. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 376-78.
62. See Id. at 380.
63. See 15U.S.C.§ 1117(a) (1994).
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infringement, courts have doubled or tripled the damage award and an
accounting of profits.64
The Lanham Act further provides that the "court shall, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances, enter judgment for three times
such profits or damages, whichever is greater, together with a reasonable
attorney's fee" in a trademark infringement case.65 Specifically, "[t]he
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party. 66 Punitive damages and prejudgment interest are not
available under the Act. 67 However, because an award of prejudgment
interest is within the discretion of the court, the Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuits have awarded interest in exceptional cases.'
Two monetary remedies, an accounting of profits and attorney's
fees, have specific recovery requirements. However, the federal circuits
split on the appropriate recovery requirement for an accounting of prof-
its.
4. An Accounting of Profits
Traditionally, courts award an accounting of profits "as a way of
compensating the plaintiff for sales lost to the infringer." 69 Although de-
fendant's profits "are a rough measure of the plaintiff's damages ...
[tihey are probably the best possible measure of damages available."7"
The courts have adopted three rationales justifying the award of an ac-
counting of profits: "(1) as a measure of plaintiff's damages; (2) if the
infringer is unjustly enriched; or (3) if necessary to deter a willful in-
fringer from doing so again."7 An accounting of profits has "historic
roots in equity jurisprudence" and is within the equitable discretion of
the courts. 72 Therefore, a court may refuse to award defendant's profits if
it believes that an injunction is a sufficient remedy .
64. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 380. See, e.g., International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n
v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the court "has
discretion to fashion an alternative remedy, or award only a partial accounting, if the aims of equity
would be better served.")
65. 15U.S.C.§ 1117(b)(1994&Supp. IV 1998).
66. Id. § 1117(a). See attorney's fees discussion infra Part 11.5.
67. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 388-89. See also Brown, supra note 43, at 76.
68. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 389. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Serv. Corp.,
1995 WL 431019, at *1153-54 (6th Cir. July 20, 1995); Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-
USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989).
69. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
30:59, at 30-98 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS].
70. Id. at 30-99 (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Crafttex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir.
1987)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 30-100.
73. Id.
2000]
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In 1916, the Supreme Court in Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf
Bros. & Co. 7 4 first acknowledged that an accounting of profits was an
acceptable award for a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit.75 In
1947, in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,76 the Supreme Court lim-
ited the Hamilton-Brown decision. The Champion Court held that an
accounting of profits is not automatic; the infringer must be guilty of
"fraud or palming-off."77 Therefore, counsel may cite the Champion de-
cision for the proposition that egregious conduct or intent must be pres-
ent for a court to award an accounting of profits.
Federal judicial circuits disagree on whether an award of a defen-
dant's profits to the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case requires a
finding of bad faith or willfulness by the defendant.7' Differing views of
whether an accounting of profits remedies unjust enrichment or penalizes
bad actions might explain the split among the circuits.79 Some circuits,
including the Tenth Circuit, have held that an award for profits remedies
the defendant's unjust enrichment from willful infringement.0 The Tenth
Circuit adopted the theory of unjust enrichment as the Circuit's recog-
nized rationale for awarding profits to a plaintiff who cannot demonstrate
actual damages as a result of trademark infringement.8 Other circuits,
including the Second Circuit, have awarded defendant's profits where
there was willful infringement but no unjust enrichment.82 Finally, the
Seventh Circuit has awarded an accounting of profits based on "either a
deterrence or unjust enrichment theory" despite the defendant's allegedly
innocent infringement.83
5. Attorney's Fees in Exceptional Cases
In 1975, Congress amended the Lanham Act to include a provision
that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party." 84 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
74. 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
75. Hamilton-Brown, 240 U.S. at 259 (holding that a plaintiff suffering trademark
infringement "is entitled to the profits acquired by defendant from the manifestly infringing sales...
76. 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
77. Champion, 331 U.S. at 131; see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, §
30:61, at 30-100.2.
78. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370-7 1. See discussion infra Part I.C.
79. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 371.
80. See Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954) "[A] trade-
mark infringer is liable as a trustee for profits accruing from his illegal acts . . . . Recovery is
predicated upon the equitable principle of unjust enrichment, not the legal theory of provable
damages." Id.
81. See Blue Bell, 213 F.2d at 363.
82. See Springs Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 724 F.2d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 1983).
83. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co. Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989).




defined "exceptional cases" as including those in which the "infringe-
ment can be characterized as 'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliberate,' or
'willful."'' 5 The use of the word "court" in the aforementioned amend-
ment to the Lanham Act has been held to mean "judge," and that the
jury's role is merely advisorial. 8
After the 1975 amendment, courts have consistently awarded attor-
ney's fees in cases of intentional, deliberate, or willful infringement.
However, because the courts have great discretion in an award of attor-
ney's fees, they "have not elaborated the criteria for an 'exceptional' case
with precision., 8 The Tenth Circuit reversed an award for attorney's fees
when the plaintiff failed to prove defendant's intent to confuse the public
or to willfully infringe on plaintiff's mark.89 Accordingly, the Tenth Cir-
cuit uses "the phrase 'bad faith' to characterize the kind of misconduct
that justifies an award of fees." 9
Courts have held that a defendant's reliance on the advice of coun-
sel may affect the award of attorney's fees. 9' If a party reasonably relies
on advice of counsel, a case might no longer fall within the "exceptional
case" provision for attorney's fees.92 However, the defendant must offer
proof of counsel's advice and evidence of defendant's reasonable reli-
ance on this advice to "defuse" otherwise willful and deliberate
conduct.93 Finally, an award of attorney's fees does not depend on the
availability of other remedies under the Lanham Act and "should not
make a case per se 'unexceptional.' 94 However, the Tenth Circuit con-
85. S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 2 (1974).
86. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:99, at 30-167.
87. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:100, at 30-168 to 30-169. See
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Kooltone, Inc. 649 F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a jury
finding of "deliberate and willful" infringement was sufficient for an award of attorney's fees);
Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l., 951 F.2d 684, 696 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
trial court judge has discretion to determine whether a case is "exceptional"); Committee for Idaho's
High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that attorney's fees were
appropriate because the district court found that the appellants "knowingly, intentionally, and
deliberately" infringed).
88 Bussert, supra note 45, at 384.
89. See VIP Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982).
90. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:100, at 30-170. See TakeCare Corp. v.
Takecare of Oklahoma, Inc., 889 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that the case law that has
developed around an "award of attorney's fees [includes] the implicit recognition that some degree
of bad faith fuels the infringement at issue."); see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d
526, 556 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that an award of attorney's fees required a "high degree of
culpability" such as "bad faith or fraud").
91. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 385.
92. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:100, at 30-171.
93. See TakeCare, 889 F.2d at 957-58 (affirming an award for attorney's fees because
defendant failed to present the advice provided by its counsel or reasonable reliance thereon).
94. Bussert, supra note 45, at 386.
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siders the lack of damages as a factor weighing against the award of at-
torney's fees. 95
B. Tenth Circuit
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit in Bishop v. Equinox
Int'l Corp.,96 examined issues surrounding awards of accounting fees and
of an accounting of profits for trademark infringement. Specifically, the
Bishop court evaluated the Tenth Circuit's adherence to the bad faith
requirement for an award of an accounting of profits.97 The court also
evaluated whether the trademark infringement at issue constituted an
exceptional case for an award of attorney's fees.9
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit reviewed a trademark infringement case brought
by James S. Bishop ("Bishop") against Equinox International Corpora-
tion ("Equinox").99 Bishop was selling a mineral electrolyte solution
under the name "Essence of Life," which is a registered trademark with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.'"0 Equinox was market-
ing a dietary supplement, "Equinox Master Formula Essence of Life
Liquid Mineral Complex."'0 ' In 1995, Bishop discovered Equinox's
product and informed Equinox that it was infringing on his registered
trademark.' 2 Bishop requested that Equinox discontinue its use of the
mark. ' 3 Subsequently, Equinox's counsel replied in writing that Equinox
would replace the phrase "Essence of Life" on its product. 0
Equinox continued to use the mark and Bishop consequently filed
suit for an injunction, an accounting of profits, and attorney fees.'05 The
district court granted a permanent injunction for the trademark infringe-
ment, but denied monetary awards based on a lack of actual damages.
' 6
However, the district court did award attorney's fees based on Equinox's
disregard of its assurances to Bishop that it would change the name of its
product.0 7
95. See VIP Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982).
96. 154 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998).
97. Bishop, 154 F.3d at 1223-24.
98. See id. at 1224.








107. See id. As a threshold matter, Equinox claimed Bishop had not used his mark for three
consecutive years and, therefore, had abandoned his mark. See id. The district court held that




a. An Accounting of Profits
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that, because
he failed to prove actual damages, Bishop was not entitled to defendant's
profits. '08 The court acknowledged that equitable considerations deter-
mine an award of an accounting of profits and that the unavailability of
actual damages does not preclude such an award. '°9 The court embraced
unjust enrichment as the Tenth Circuit's rationale for awarding defen-
dant's profits." ° Consequently, the court recognized that actual damage
is a factor to consider but is not essential in awarding defendant's
profits."' Additionally, the court held that "a showing that defendant's
actions were willful or in bad faith" is essential for an award of an ac-
counting of profits."2 The court reasoned that the bad faith requirement is
reasonable because an accounting of profits might create a windfall
judgment by overcompensating the plaintiff.' '3 The court remanded the
issue because the court could not determine with certainty whether ap-




In Bishop,.the Tenth Circuit held that, under the Lanham Act, the
prevailing party may recover attorney's fees in "exceptional cases.""' 5
The court noted the Senate Committee's definition of an exceptional case
as "'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliberate,' or 'willful' " infringement. "6
Finally, the court noted that absence of actual damages does not preclude
See id. at 1221-22. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling that Bishop had
not abandoned his mark. See id.
108. See id. at 1221.
109. See id. at 1222.
110. See id. at 1223. The court recognized the two rationales for awarding an accounting of
defendant's profits- "preventing unjust enrichment and deterring willful infringement"-but
confirmed unjust enrichment as the Tenth Circuit's approach. Id. (citing Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier




114. See id. at 1223-24. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the district court's finding that
Equinox's disregard of its attorney's assurance that it would refrain from infringing on Bishop's
trademark constituted a deliberate or willful infringement. See id. at 1223. Additionally, the court
noted that Bishop's economic weakness might have motivated Equinox's action. See id. at 1224.
However, the court determined that the district court should reconsider these issues using the correct
legal standard. See id.
115. Id. at 1224 (using the abuse of discretion standard of review).
116. Id. (quoting VIP Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982)).
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an award of attorney's fees, but is a factor in determining whether a case
is exceptional.' 
7
Failing to find a clear error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's award of attorney's fees."8 The court found that Equinox deliber-
ately and willfully infringed because it continued to use the "Essence of
Life" mark after its written commitment to cease and desist from using
the mark."9 The court did not question the district court's incredulity
toward Equinox's assertion that it had reasonably believed that Bishop
had abandoned its mark.'2 Instead, the court agreed that Equinox's con-
tinued use of the mark was rooted in its belief that Bishop's relative eco-
nomic weakness would prevent him from further asserting his rights in
the mark' 2' The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the district court's discretion
to fashion an equitable remedy and affirmed the award of attorney's
fees. 22
C. Other Circuits
As evidenced above, the Tenth Circuit requires a finding of bad faith
and willful infringement for an award of defendant's profits and attor-
ney's fees for trademark infringement. However, not all federal circuits
follow the Tenth Circuit's requirements to award defendant's profits.
Federal judicial circuits split on whether an award of an accounting of
profits to the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case requires a finding
of bad faith or willfulness by the defendant.'23 The D.C., Second, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits require the defendant to have willfully infringed on
the plaintiff's trademark in bad faith for an award of defendant's
profits.' 24 In contrast, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have abandoned
the bad faith requirement for awarding an accounting of profits.'2 The




120. See id. If Bishop had abandoned, or ceased to use, his mark, Equinox could have asserted
abandonment as a viable defense to trademark infringement. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(2) (1994).
121. See Bishop, at 1224.
122. See id.
123. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370.
124. See International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc., 80 F.3d
749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc. 821 F.2d 800, 807-08
(D.C. Cit. 1987); Nalpac Ltd. v. Coming Glass Works, 784 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cit. 1986); Blue Bell
Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954).
125. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
Lanham Act provides for an awarding of profits, which is in the discretion and equitable
consideration of the court); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[Tlhe
principles of equity referred to in section 1117(a) do not in our view justify withholding all monetary
relief from the victim of a trademark infringement merely because the infringement was innocent.");
Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("Nor is an award of profits based
on either unjust enrichment or deterrence dependent upon a higher showing of culpability on the part
of the defendant, who is purposely using the trademark.").
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be inappropriate in some circumstances. 26 Finally, the Fifth Circuit em-
ploys a compromise approach, evaluating a finding of bad faith or will-
fulness as a factor rather than a requrement.27
For an award of attorney's fees, the Tenth Circuit followed the
common interpretation of the Lanham Act's "exceptional cases" re-
quirement, which allows reasonable attorney's fees when infringement
was "malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.', 28 Although the court
did not articulate precise criteria for "exceptional cases," it seemed to
agree that a showing of bad faith warranted the award of attorney fees.
129
This view affirms past Tenth Circuit decisions and is supported by the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits.'30
D. Analysis
By enforcing the bad faith requirement, the Bishop court consistently
follows previous Tenth Circuit decisions, the majority of federal circuits,
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, and the Supreme Court's
guidance.' 3 ' Resolutely adopting the bad faith requirement, the Bishop
court stated that "[riequiring a showing of willfulness before profits are
awarded is an appropriate limitation in light of the equitable considera-
tions underlying the monetary recovery provisions of the Lanham Act."
132
126. See Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 1995) ("An instruction that
willful infringement is a prerequisite to an award of defendant's profits may be an error in some
circumstances (as when plaintiff seeks the defendant's profits as a measure of his own damage.)").
127. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998).
128. Bussert, supra note 45, at 383. See also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, §
30:99, at 30-166.
129. See Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the
district court's finding that Equinox's infringement was "deliberate or willful" because Equinox
continued using the "Essence of Life" mark based on Bishop's economic weakness).
130. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 556 (5th Cir. 1998); Aromatique,
Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 877 (8th Cir. 1994); TakeCare Corp. v. Takecare of Oklahoma,
Inc., 889 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 1989).
131. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (refusing to award an
accounting of profits because plaintiff failed to show fraud or palming off); Hamilton-Brown Shoe
Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259-62 (1916) (Although the Supreme Court has not offered
clear-cut authority on the issue, the Court has treated bad faith at least as a factor in awarding
defendant's profits); Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954)
("[A] trade-mark infringer is liable as a trustee for profits accruing from his illegal acts ...
Recovery is predicated upon the equitable principle of unjust enrichment, not the legal theory of
provable damages."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37(l)(a) (1995) (An award
of profits is contingent on demonstrating that "the actor engaged in the conduct with the intention of
causing confusion or deception."); Eugene W. Luciani, Does the Bad Faith Requirement in
Accounting of Profits Damages Make Economic Sense?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 69, 69 (1998) ("[A]
majority of the circuits require a finding of bad faith before awarding an accounting of profits.").
132. See Bishop, 154 F.3d at 1223 ("[Wle are mindful that an award of profits requires a
showing that defendant's actions were willful or in bad faith.").
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Some scholars criticize the Tenth Circuit's adherence to the bad faith
requirement.' 3  The critics argue that the bad faith requirement will cause
over-deterrence "in the realm of product configuration and descriptive
work marks."' For example, a company that adopts a mark with a "bor-
derline descriptive word" might deter other companies within the market
from using the same word to describe their products, even though that
word "is essential to the marketing of the good.' 35 Consequently, critics
claim that this over-deterrence would effectively grant the trademark
owner a "back door" patent on certain product configurations.1
3 6
One possible response to such concerns is to adopt the analysis ap-
plied by the Fifth Circuit in trademark infringement cases, which evalu-
ates a finding of bad faith or willfulness as a factor rather than as a re-
quired element. The Fifth Circuit balances the following factors:
(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2)
whether sales have been diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies,
(4) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5)
the public interest in making the misconduct unprofitable, and (6)
whether it is a case of palming off."'
Because the Fifth Circuit's balancing approach retains the infringer's
willfulness as a factor in its analysis, the Circuit's approach is an inter-
mediary step to fully dispensing with the bad faith requirement.
38
In any event, the critics' concerns regarding over-deterrence would
not affect the Bishop decision. Bishop's "Essence of Life" trademark
would probably be characterized as suggestive or arbitrary and fanciful,
not as descriptive.' 39 Therefore, this particular mark would not overly
deter other companies in the electrolyte solution market from marketing
a certain product configuration. Because the danger of over-deterrence
only occurs when a "borderline descriptive mark" is at issue,' 4° the
Bishop Court's adherence to the bad faith requirement does not grant
unwarranted patent protection. Additionally, the bad faith requirement
133. See Luciani, supra note 131, at 93.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. A "back-door" patent refers to protection equivalent to a registered patent but that is
not obtained through a patent filed with the Patent and Trademark Office.
137. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998). "Palm off' is
defined as "the conduct of selling goods as the goods of another or doing business as the business of
another such that the public is misled by the conduct and believes it is purchasing the goods or doing
business with someone other than the actual seller." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (6th ed.
1990).
138. See Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 554-55.
139. See discussion supra Part I.B.
140. Luciani, supra note 131, at 93.
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provides a threshold for recovery that protects against a windfall judg-
ment that might overcompensate an undeserving plaintiff.
4'
Because the Senate Committee defined an "exceptional case" as
"'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliberate,' and 'willful"' infringement, an
award of attorney's fees is interconnected with the bad faith requirement
of an accounting of profits. 2 By performing one test, whether the in-
fringer acted willfully and in bad faith, the court can determine whether
to award two types of damages: an accounting of profits and attorney's
fees.'43 Consequently, adhering to the willfulness requirement encourages
court consistency and efficiency.
II. THE FEDERAL PATENT SCHEME AND STATE LAW
To protect corporate clients' intellectual property rights further,
counsel must also attend to federal patent laws that provide exclusive
control over an inventor's scientific creativity. These federal patent
rights may conflict with state licensing rights because of broad federal
preemption of state law. However, counsel may use carefully carved out
exemptions to the preemption doctrine to draft competent licensing con-
tracts.
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." ' 4 Utilizing this grant of authority, federal
patent laws protect copyrighted works and patented discoveries from
unauthorized copying for a limited period. During this period, "to en-
courage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation,
Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the form of
control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works.' 45 The
public retains a general right to "copy" unpatented subject matter, as well
as previously protected subject matter after the patent expires. 46 The fed-
eral patent scheme protects "free access to copy whatever the federal
patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."'
147
Congress intended the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitu-
tion to provide a federal system of protection. 48 In 1964, the Supreme
Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 149 and Compco Corp. v. Day-
141. See Bishop, 154 F.3d at 1223.
142. Id. at 1224.
143. See id. at 1223-1224.
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
145. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
146. See Todd Wong, Patent Law: The Patchwork Approach of the Supreme Court and its
Interplay with State Law, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 581, 590 (1991).
147. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
148. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555-56.
149. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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Brite Lighting, Inc.5° established that federal patent law preempts state
laws that regulate unpatented subject matter."' A state law, "whether
common law or statute, will be preempted where it frustrates the under-
lying congressional objectives of. . . the Patent Act . . .. ""' However,
since 1964, the Supreme Court has carved out significant exceptions to
the broad federal preemption doctrine, creating a "patchwork approach"
to federal patent law and its interaction with state law.' 3 Federal courts
have wrestled with this approach in their individual attempts to deter-
mine the viability and reach of state's intellectual property laws. The




In its Sears and Compco decisions, the Supreme Court recognized
three policy objectives for enforcing federal patent laws: "promoting
invention, preserving free competition, and having national uniformity in
patent and copyright laws."' 5 The Supreme Court has explained that "the
question of whether federal law pre-empts state law 'involves a consid-
eration of whether that [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.' 56 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.57 and Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co.,'"5 the Court carved out significant exceptions to the
federal patent preemption doctrine. 59 In these cases, the Court permitted
state regulation because the respective laws did not interfere with patent
policy objectives.'6
The Kewanee Oil Court evaluated whether Ohio's trade secret laws
stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of congres-
sional policy objectives.16 The state law in controversy granted protec-
150. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
151. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-33 (holding that an Illinois state law could not prohibit the copying
of an unpatented floor lamp design nor could the law award damages for copying of the lamp);
Compco, 376 U.S. at 239 (holding that Illinois law regulating unpatented subject matter was limited
solely to measures that would prevent consumer confusion).
152. Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183, 192 (1998).
153. Wong, supra note 146, at 581-82.
154. 174 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 1999).
155. David J. Gutowski, Note, Preemption, Exclusive Jurisdiction, and the Patent Laws, 17
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 137, 145 (1999).
156. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
157. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
158. Aronson, 440 U.S. 257.
159. See Gutowski, supra note 155, at 145-146.
160. See Id.
161. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 479.
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tion to an unpatentable manufacturing process. 12 Nevertheless, the Court
held that state trade secret laws do not hinder the incentive to invent,
inhibit full disclosure of inventions, or remove subject matter from the
public domain.163 Finding that state trade secret law does not compromise
congressional policy objectives, the Court held that federal patent law
does not preempt state trade secret laws."
In Aronson, the Supreme Court further limited the Sears-Compco
doctrine with respect to state contract law. In cases of patent infringe-
ment, "the patent owner is entitled to recover the profits he would have
earned on the patented product but for the infringement."'' 65 As a mini-
mum, the patentee is entitled to the calculation of a reasonable royalty' 6
"for the unlawful manufacture, use or sale of the patented product by the
infringer."'
'67
The Aronson Court evaluated whether federal patent law preempted
"a contract to pay royalties to a patent applicant, on sales of articles em-
bodying [patentable subject matter] ....,, Although the contract related
to intellectual property, the Court reasoned that commercial agreements,
which were traditionally "the domain of state law," could not be dis-
placed merely because of their intellectual property nature.'69 Thus, roy-
alty agreements that do not interfere with federal patent objectives are
enforceable. 70 Although the Supreme Court had previously held that
162. See id. at 473-74. Kewanee Oil was a "manufacturer of a type of synthetic crystal which
is useful in the detection of ionizing radiation." Id. at 473. Because the processes by which it had
manufactured this crystal had been in commercial use for over a year, they were not eligible for
patent protection. See id. at 474.
163. See id. at 490-491.
Even were an inventor to keep his discovery completely to himself, something that
neither the patent nor trade secret laws forbid, there is a high probability that it will be
soon independently developed. If the invention, though still a trade secret, is put into
public use, the competition is alerted to the existence of the inventor's solution to the
problem and may be encouraged to make an extra effort to independently find the
solution thus known to be possible .... We conclude that the extension of trade secret
protection to clehrly patentable inventions does not conflict with the patent policy of
disclosure.
Id.
164. See id. at 493.
165. Peter B. Frank, et al., Economic Damages in Patent Infringement Cases, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1991, at 285, 290 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 321, 1991).
166. See Nancy J. Linck & Barry P. Golob, Patent Damages: The Basics, 34 IDEA 13, 21-27
(1993). Royalties constitute compensatory damages for patent infringement. See id. at 14. A royalty
award correlates to the sales that the infringer generated from the patented product. See id. at 25-26.
Typically, courts determine royalty awards by "multiplying the infringer's total sales of infringing
product by the reasonable royalty rate." Id. at 21.
167. Frank, supra note 165, at 290.
168. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259 (1979).
169. Id. at 262.
170. See id. at 262-63. The Court reasoned that the contract was enforceable because
Congressional patent law objectives were not frustrated: (1) "enforceable agreements licensing the
use of [inventor's] inventions in return for royalties provides an additional incentive to invention";
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enforcing contractual obligations to pay royalties in return for the use of
a patented device may not extend beyond the life of the patent,7 the Ar-
onson Court enforced a contract to pay reduced royalties to a patent ap-
plicant even though the patent grant was pending. 72 The Court reasoned
that enforcing the "contract would not 'withdraw any idea from the pub-
lic domain' because the contract induced the creator to disclose her idea
in the first place."'
73
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 71 the Supreme
Court returned to the Sears-Compco doctrine to clarify the "Court's
patchwork approach to state regulation of intellectual properties."'' 75 The
Court reaffirmed the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine stating that
"state regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it
clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent laws.' 76 The
Court struck down a state statute on unfair competition that effectively
granted patent protection to an unpatentable manufacturing process."'
However, the court distinguished Bonito Boats from Kewanee finding
that the state statute at issue hindered the policy goals of the federal pat-
ent scheme.' 78 Consequently, the Bonito Boats Court said that the Court
would strike down statutes that "restrict the public's ability to exploit
ideas that the patent system mandates shall be free for all to use.",179
B. Tenth Circuit
On April 8, 1999, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a breach of contract
case involving a patent royalties licensing agreement in Naimie v. Cyto-
zyme Labs., Inc.'"o The court examined the issue of whether state contract
law or federal patent law governs the parties' rights to license chemical
formulations in exchange for royalties. In this context the court evaluated
(2) the manufacture of the inventions provides disclosure of the inventions; and (3) the manufacture
and sale of the inventions assures the design remains in the public domain for the free use of the
public. Id.
171. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964).
172. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 267.
173. Wong, supra note 146, at 586 (quoting Aronson, 440 U.S. at 263).
174. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
175. Wong, supra note 146, at 582 (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152).
176. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
177. See id. at 168. The Florida statute prohibited the use of a "direct molding process to
duplicate unpatented boat hulls." Id. at 144. The plaintiff did not file a patent application to protect
utilitarian or design aspects of the boat hulls. See id.
178. See Gutowski, supra note 155, at 146. The Court reasoned that "[t]he Florida statute is
aimed directly at the promotion of intellectual creation by substantially restricting the public's ability
to exploit ideas that the patent system mandates shall be free for all to use .... The Florida law
substantially restricts the public's ability to exploit an unpatented design in general circulation."
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167.
179. Gutowski, supra note 155, at 146. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167.
180. 174 F.3d 1104, 1108(10th Cir. 1999).
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whether the licensing agreement, formed under state law, undermined the
purposes and objectives of the federal patent scheme.
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit reviewed an appeal by Cytozyme Laboratories,
Inc., ("Cytozyme") from a judgement awarding Dr. Naimie ("Naimie")
damages for breach of contract.'8 ' Cytozyme, a manufacturer of nutri-
tional plant and animal growth enhancement products, invited Naimie, a
chemical engineer, to develop new formulations for its products.8 2 In
January 1981, Cytozyme offered to pay Naimie "royalties in exchange
for the transfer of 'a new technology base' to be developed by Dr.
Naimie."'8 3 Naimie accepted and on September 28, 1981, Cytozyme
confirmed the agreement to pay royalties to Naimie on Cytozyme's com-
pleted products that used Naimie's formulations.' 84 Naimie continued
developing formulations and began receiving royalty payments in No-
vember 1981.185
The parties formed a second agreement on May 28, 1985 hiring
Naimie as a full-time consultant at $60,000 salary for seven years, plus
travel expenses and royalties on his formulations. 1 6 In October 1990,
Cytozyme terminated Naimie and stopped making royalty payments.'
87
On May 6, 1991, Naimie sent a letter to Cytozyme, terminating its li-
cense to use his formulations.188 Cytozyme continued using Naimie's
formulations and Naimie filed suit for breach of contract and declaratory
judgement.' 9
The district court held that a verbal licensing agreement existed
between the parties giving "Cytozyme the exclusive right to use
[Naimie's] formulations in exchange for royalties on products using
those formulations."''90 Additionally, the court found that a written con-
sulting agreement existed between the parties, employing Naimie as a
full-time consultant at Cytozyme.' 9' Both the licensing agreement and the
written agreement were "in full force and effect" at the time of Naimie's
termination. '9' Therefore, the district court awarded Naimie unpaid fees
for consulting services and unpaid royalties for the period between June
181. See Naimie, 174 F.3d at 1107.
182. See id. at 1107.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 1107-08.
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1990 and August 1996.193 Cytozyme appealed, arguing that "the district
court's findings regarding ownership [of contract rights] create state pat-
ent rights-a result the Supreme Court prohibited in Bonito Boats...
,,194
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the award of royalties, holding that state
contract law, not federal patent law, governed the parties' rights.' 95 The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "states retain the power to 'adopt rules
for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions'
so long as those rules do not impermissibly interfere with the federal
patent scheme." '96 Applying the reasoning of Aronson, the Naimie court
concluded that the parties' state licensing agreement did not undermine
the federal patent scheme. 97 First, the court agreed that enforcing licens-
ing agreements fosters and rewards invention by providing an additional
incentive to create.' 98 Second, the court reasoned that enforcing licensing
agreements promotes disclosure of inventions because it "encourages the
exploitation of an invention that might otherwise remain undeveloped
and therefore inaccessible to the public." '99 Nor does such an agreement
impede the public from discovering "the formulations through reverse
engineering or independent creation."'z Finally, the court reasoned that
enforcing the licensing agreement would not remove ideas from the pub-
lic domain because the formulations were not in the public domain be-
fore the parties formed the agreement.0 ' Therefore, the Naimie Court
held that enforcing the licensing agreement would not conflict with the
federal patent scheme and, therefore, awarded Naimie unpaid royalties.2 2
C. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's resolution of the conflict between state contract
law and federal patent law is consistent with the Supreme Court and
other federal circuit decisions. The Ninth Circuit has held that federal
copyright and patent laws do not preempt protection of certain property
193. See id.
194. Id. at 1109 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168
(1989)). Cytozyme also challenged the district court's findings that the second written agreement
was not an integrated contract, that insufficient evidence existed to find a verbal licensing
agreement, and that Naimie rescinded any license agreement he might have had. See id. at 1108.
195. See id. at 1110.
196. Id. at 1109 (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165). See also Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("[T]he states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual
property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.").








interests under California law. 23 Because the particular property right
encouraged innovation, was available to the public for reproduction, and
was not "patent-like," the Ninth Circuit found that there was no conflict
of law. 20m The Federal Circuit has held that federal patent law does not
preempt state tort law involving intentional interference with actual and
prospective contractual relations. 25 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
"the state law cause of action ... does not present an 'obstacle' to the
execution and accomplishment of the patent laws.",2' Exposing the limits
of state law protection-when confronted with enforcing state contract
law that would extend protection beyond the life of a patent-the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits have held that the federal patent scheme preempts
state law.2 7 Nevertheless, because sufficient ambiguity exists in this area,
Congress should adopt a uniform national standard.
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision follows the Supreme Court's carefully
carved out Aronson exception to the federal patent scheme for state con-
tract law. However, a question arises as states dutifully follow this law:
"[T]o what extent should the states be permitted to intervene in what is
predominantly a federal sphere? ' 208 Arguably, Congress designed patent
law to be strictly reserved to federal regulation in order to achieve a uni-
form national standard.' However, the Supreme Court made the federal
patent scheme vulnerable to inconsistency when it began to carve out
exceptions to this federal power.2' In the1989 Bonito Boats decision,
203. See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903-05
(9th Cir. 1992).
204. See Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 905. The court held that the plaintiff had a property right in
his Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), which was required by anyone who wished to make a
major alteration to an airplane. See id. at 899, 905. The court further held that the property right did
not conflict with federal patent law. See id. at 905. The court reasoned that (1) the STC itself
disclosed the plaintiffs research that would stimulate further innovation in the field of aeronautics,
and (2) the right was not "patent like" because the plaintiff did not claim an "exclusive right to
modify DC-8s as described in his STC." Id.
205. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
206. Dow Chemical, 139 F.3d at 1475. The court indicated that the state's tort law would not
affect "the incentive to invent, the full disclosure of ideas, or the principle that ideas in the public
domain remain in the public domain." Id. Additionally, the court reasoned that the law's purpose
was to protect the integrity of commercial contracts, which, as the Aronson Court noted, were in the
domain of the states. See id. (citing Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262).
207. See Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
licensing agreement was unlawful because it extended the defendant's monopoly power beyond the
patent period); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1373 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
licensing agreement was unenforceable because the terms "constituted an effort to extend payments
for patent rights beyond the patent period."). Both the Seventh Circuit and Eleventh Circuit
decisions comply with the Supreme Court's approach to the same issue in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379
U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964). See discussion supra, Part I.
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coming a decade after the Aronson decision, "the Supreme Court ...
attempted to resolve conflicting decisions ... regarding federal preemp-
tion of state laws regulating unpatented subject matter.2 ' The Court
clearly stated that "the States may not offer patent-like protection to in-
tellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a mat-
ter of federal law., 212 Therefore, patent law should fall exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Following the various contracts
laws of fifty states fosters a piecemeal encroachment on federal law that
will "compromise the uniformity inherent in one national standard and
make notice to potential infringers more difficult., 213 Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's push for change in 1989, the solution to this growing
problem lies in encouraging a uniform body of law through Congress and
the federal judiciary and in preserving the federal patent law scheme.
2 4
CONCLUSION
In the age of fast-paced technological breakthroughs, legal counsel
advising corporate clients must be attentive to current intellectual prop-
erty laws and the federal circuits' application of those laws. For trade-
mark law, counsel should refer to the Lanham Act to determine the ex-
tent of protection available for business marks, the test used to determine
trademark infringement, and the damages available for infringement. In
the Tenth Circuit, counsel should note the limitations on the recovery of
monetary damages for infringement, including those imposed upon an
accounting of profits and attorney's fees. Although the federal circuits
split on the requirements necessary for recovery, the Tenth Circuit re-
quires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted willfully or in bad
faith when the defendant infringed on the plaintiff's mark. If the plaintiff
proves the defendant's willful infringement by a preponderance of the
evidence, the Tenth Circuit, pursuant to its equitable discretion may
award defendant's gross profits and attorney's fees. While critics ques-
tion the bad faith requirement, counsel should note that the Tenth Circuit
remains concerned about the defendant's unjust enrichment and believes
the willfulness requirement will act as a deterrent.
Secondly, legal counsel should be attentive to patent protection
granted by the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Gener-
ally, this federal patent protection preempts state laws that obstruct the
federal patent scheme to protect and encourage intellectual creativity and
invention. However, the Supreme Court has carved out significant state
law exceptions to the broad doctrine of federal preemption, creating a
patchwork approach to patent protection. Counsel advising corporate
clients should note that the Tenth Circuit has exempted from the federal
211. Wong, supra note 146, at 581.
212. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
213. See Wong, supra note 146, at 594.
214. See id. at 596.
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patent scheme those state licensing agreements that do not extend the
scope or time limits of federal patent protection. Therefore, when draft-
ing licensing agreements regarding patent rights, counsel should consider
the interplay between state contract law and federal patent law.
Kara L. Rossetti

